Can Copyright Plaintiffs Recover Damages for Acts Outside of the Copyright Act’s Statute of Limitations?

Warner Chappell Music, the global music publishing arm of Warner Music Group, filed its opening brief to the U.S. Supreme Court on November 27, 2023, requesting that the Court overturn a lower court ruling that held that a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for copyright infringement occurring more than three years before the filing of the lawsuit if the plaintiff’s claim is timely under the discovery rule. Under Section 507(b) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), “[n]o civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” However, there is a circuit split on the interpretation of this statute. While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the three-year limit applies from the moment copyright infringement took place, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled that the three-year limit applies from when the copyright holder knew or should have known about the infringement. The Second, Eleventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals “are home to the major artistic centers of New York, Los Angeles, and Miami,” and the decisions of these courts can significantly impact copyright lawsuits. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Warner Chappel Music, Inc. v. Nealy, No. 22-1078, 2023 WL 3306517.

The co-owner of the copyright, musician Sherman Nealy (“Nealy”), argues that he only learned of the alleged copyright infringements in 2016 upon his release after serving a lengthy prison sentence. While the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of Warner Chappell Music and other named defendants, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Nealy can sue for copyright infringement under the “discovery rule.” In its petition for cert., Warner Chappell Music argued that “[t]he discovery rule expands a defendant’s financial exposure beyond that contemplated by the statutory text” and that “if a plaintiff delays long enough, the evidence needed for a defendant to demonstrate authorization to use the copyrighted work may be unavailable due to the passage of time.” Id. at 15.